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ARCHIVE – The Director of National Intelligence of the United States Avril Haines testifies before the Commission of Senate Armed Services on May 10, 2022. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)
During a private meeting weeks before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in late February, US intelligence officials were asked a question: Was Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, more like Winston Churchill? or Afghan President Ashraf Ghani? In other words, would Zelenskyy lead a historic resistance, or would he flee like Ghani, as his government collapsed?
In the end, US intelligence agencies underestimated Zelenskyy and the Ukraine, While they overestimated Russia and its president, they correctly predicted that Vladimir Putin would order the invasion.
However, the United States intelligence failed. by predicting the fall in a few days of kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. And while American spy agencies have been given credit for aiding the Ukrainian resistance, they now face bipartisan pressure to examine what their mistakes were, especially their mistake in judging the situation in Afghanistan on last year.
Intelligence authorities have begun a review of how their agencies judge the willingness and ability of other governments to fight. That work comes as the agencies continue to play a critical role in Ukraine and the White House ramps up its deliveries of weapons and other support to Ukraine, trying to forecast what to expect. could Putin interpret as an escalation and trying to avoid a direct war with Russia.
The administration of President Joe Biden announced That would give Ukraine a small number of modern medium-range rocket systems, a weapon that kyiv has been asking for for a long time. Since the start of the war on February 24, the White House has approved the shipment of drones and anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, in addition to millions of munitions.
The United States has lifted initial restrictions on the release of intelligence information, to provide data that Ukraine has used to attack key targets, including the flagship of the Russian Navy.
Lawmakers from both parties question whether the United States could have done more before Putin invaded and whether the White House refrained from offering more support, based on gloomy forecasts about Ukraine. Independent Sen. Angus King told officials at a hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee last month that “if we had a better forecast, we could have done more to assist the Ukrainians before.”
Representative Mike Turner, Republican of the House Intelligence Committee, said in an interview that he thought the White House and top officials The government officials had projected “their own biases onto the situation in such a way that it to inaction.”
The Senate Intelligence Committee sent a secret letter last month to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, in which he asked how spy agencies evaluated Ukraine and Afghanistan. The existence of the letter was initially reported by CNN.
Director Avril Haines told lawmakers in May that the National Intelligence Council would review how agencies assess “the will to fight and the ability to fight.” Both aspects are “very difficult to analyze and we are examining different methodologies to do so,” admitted Haines.
Although a timeline for the review has not been announced, it began Prior to the commission letter, officials have identified some errors. Several people familiar with the prewar assessments spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because they were discussing intelligence matters.
Despite its vast advantages, Russia failed to win. He established air superiority over the Ukraine and failed. on basic tasks, like protecting your battle communications. It has lost thousands of soldiers and at least eight to 10 generals, according to US estimates. Russian and Ukrainian forces are now facing fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine, a far cry from Moscow’s swift victory. that the United States and the West expected.
Although Russia has been involved in several third-party wars recently, it has not directly fought a major ground conflict since the 1980s. That means many of Russia’s projected capabilities had not been tested, which It presented a challenge for analysts in assessing how Russia would fare in the event of a major invasion, some of the sources said. many to think that Moscow it would have many more missile systems and aircraft ready for deployment.
Russia has not used biological or chemical weapons, as Washington warned. what could i do An official noted that the United States had “very serious concerns” He said about a chemical attack, but that Russia might have decided that would cause too much global opposition. Fears that Russia could use a wave of cyberattacks against Ukraine and its allies have also so far failed to materialize.
Other Russian problems were well known, including low morale among troops, a prevalence of abuse of drugs and alcohol among soldiers and the lack of a non-commissioned officer corps to supervise troops and relay instructions from commanders.
“We knew that all those problems existed,” retired Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. “But he turned around. a domino effect How overwhelming it all became. when they tried to do even the simplest operations”.
Sue Gordon, a former deputy director of national intelligence, said analysts may have relied too much on counting Russia’s inventory of military and cyber tools.
“Let’s learn a little bit about how we think about capacity and use as not the same thing when you’re evaluating the outcome,” Gordon said recently at an event sponsored by The Cipher Brief, an intelligence publication.
Zelenskyy he has been praised globally for refusing to flee while Russia sent teams to try to capture or kill him.
During the Nazi aerial bombardments of London in World War II, Churchill observed He often attacked from rooftops in the capital and made a special effort to walk the streets in places where thousands had died.
In contrast, Afghan President Ghani slipped away. He left the country on a Sunday last August, alone and isolated, a few months after the United States had called on him to forge a united resistance as the withdrawal of American troops drew near. Ghani did not even tell other political leaders that he was preparing to leave, while a peaceful transition of power with the Taliban was negotiated. The sudden and secret departure of him dej & gué; He rudderless to Kabul, the capital, as US and NATO troops were in the final stages of their chaotic withdrawal from the country after 20 years.
In Zelenskyy’s case, there were also tensions with Washington before the war, over the likelihood of a Russian invasion and whether Ukraine was prepared. One flashpoint, according to people familiar with the dispute, was that the United States wanted Ukraine to move troops from the west to strengthen defenses around kyiv.
Until shortly before the invasion, Zelenskyy and top officials in his government dismissed warnings of an invasion, in part to prevent public panic and protect the economy. A US official said there was a belief that Zelenskyy had never been tested in a crisis of the level he was facing his country.
Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the current director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified. In March: “My opinion was that, based on various factors, the Ukrainians were not as ready as I thought they were. what they should. Therefore, I questioned his will to fight. That was a bad conclusion on my part, because they have fought bravely and honorably and they are doing the right thing.”
In May, Berrier distanced himself from He contrasted his own opinion with that of the rest of the intelligence community, which, he revealed, never had an assessment “that the Ukrainians lacked the will to fight.”
There was ample evidence of Ukrainian determination before the war.
Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the eight-year conflict in the eastern region The Donbass hardened the attitudes of the Ukrainian people towards Moscow. The Ukrainian forces had received years of training and weapons shipments from the United States, as well as help to strengthen their cyber defenses.
US intelligence agencies had reviewed private polls indicating strong support in Ukraine for any resistance. In Kharkiv, a mostly Russian-speaking city near the border, citizens were learning to use firearms and training for guerrilla warfare.
Rep. A member of House Intelligence saw that determination in person during a trip in December. Wenstrup witnessed A military ceremony in which participants read the names of every Ukrainian soldier killed the day before on the front lines in Donbas, where pro-Russian separatists backed by Moscow are fighting. they have been fighting the government since 2014.
“ that they had the will to fight, & rdquo ;, he said. “This has been brewing for a long time”.